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In proposing meaningful consultation with victims and defendants in
a context of advisory prosecutorial guidelines, Professor Michael
O'Hear has an idea worth examining, and, in the main, worth
supporting.' By "consulting" O'Hear means more than dictating; he
means meaningful consultation. With meaningful consultation
prosecutors explain things, gather information, listen to victims and
defendants, and then formulate plea offers.
In proposing a plea process involving victims, O'Hear is exposed to
dogmatic academic criticism because a premise of his proposal is the
vindication of the victim. To gather a sense of the nature of such
criticism, it is instructive to turn to Professor Erin O'Hara, who has
insightfully written, "Given that virtually all law professors were trained
in criminal law classes that ignored victim involvement in the criminal
justice process, it is perhaps not surprising that it is considered heretical
to suggest that direct participation by victims might be warranted."2
O'Hara encourages replacing dogma with more creative academic
thinking:
[A]s a positive matter, victim involvement in the criminal
process is becoming and will continue to be a reality of
our criminal justice process. Too often law professors
feel content to dogmatically insist that crimes are wrongs
committed against the public rather than an individual
and that, therefore, victim involvement in criminal cases
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beyond the potential witness capacity is inappropriate.
Contrary to their assertions, however, victims have been
involved in the disposition of criminal cases for much
longer than they have been marginalized, and they are
unlikely to remain impotent forces in the disposition of
cases. As a consequence, advocates must think creatively
about how to provide victims with participation at a
minimal cost to existing procedural protections for
defendants.3
O'Hear has risen to O'Hara's challenge by thinking creatively about
"how to provide victims with participation at a minimal cost to existing
procedural protections for defendants."4  Academic heresy or not,
O'Hear's proposal advances the conversation about plea bargaining in
an era of victims' rights. Moreover, O'Hear's idea is substantively
grounded in, and promotes, important criminal process values.
I. THE HUMAN DIGNITY VALUE
O'Hear takes Professor Jerry Mashaw's scholarship on human
dignity (as a basis for due process in administrative law) and applies it to
crime victims' participation rights This is a sensible approach given
both the persuasive case Mashaw makes and the aptness of O'Hear's
application to victim participation in criminal process. There is ample
evidence in victims' rights laws to justify O'Hear's application of
Mashaw's dignity theory. By 1999, twenty states expressly included the
value of "dignity" in constitutional victims' rights.6 Other states have
the same language in their respective statutes.7 The federal Crime
Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) provides an express "right to be treated
with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy.",8 The
legislative history of the CVRA identifies the same type of concern for
dignity that appears in Mashaw's scholarship: "Too often victims of
crime experience a secondary victimization at the hands of the criminal
justice system. This provision is intended to direct government agencies
and employees.., to treat victims of crime with the respect they deserve
3. Id. at 233-34.
4. See id. at 234.
5. O'Hear, supra note 1, at 330-31.
6. Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation
Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, 328-30.
7. Id.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8) (Supp. 2004).
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and to afford them due process." 9  O'Hear is on solid ground in
recognizing that victim participation is largely based on valuing the
human dignity of crime victims.
II. THE EQUALITY VALUE AND ITS CHANGED NATURE
The idea of equality to avoid bias for similarly situated defendants in
charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing is not new. For some, this
equality is the only legitimate equality. Were this the only legitimate
equality it would mean separating victims' voices from the criminal
process. Under this view, victims should not consult with prosecutors
about pleas or make sentencing recommendations to judges because
victims' voices introduce individual victim harm which, in turn, creates
the potential for unequal treatment of similarly situated defendants. To
avoid this, the argument continues, defendant punishment should be
determined by the criminal statute violated and to a lesser extent other
criteria, such as the defendant's criminal history, but should not include
information from, or about, the victim."0
However, defendants do not have a monopoly over adverse bias in
the criminal process; unequal dispositions also result from bias against
victims. Like defendants, crime victims are at risk of bias when
government actors exercise discretion. For example, one study found
that non-white crime victims are disproportionately not afforded their
rights at the plea bargain stage." Professor Steven Carter reviewed the
Baldus study, which examined death penalty cases involving black
defendants and victims, and concluded that "[a] black defendant whose
victim is white is twenty-two times more likely to receive the death
penalty than is a black defendant whose victim happens to share his
race." 2 Professor Elizabeth Stanko's study of a New York prosecutor's
office revealed bias in charging decisions involving a variety of types of
victims." Another example is the failure to even consider domestic
9. 150 CONG. REC. S10911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Senator Kyl).
10. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 856-67 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing against victim impact statements).
11. NAT'L VICTIM CTR., COMPARISON OF WHITE AND NON-WHITE CRIME VICTIM
RESPONSES REGARDING VICTIMS' RIGHTS (1997), reprinted in DOUGLAS E. BELOOF ET
AL., VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 695 (2d ed. 2006).
12. Stephen L. Carter, Comment, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420,
444 (1988).
13. Elizabeth Anne Stanko, The Impact of Victim Assessment on Prosecutors' Screening
Decisions: The Case of the New York County District Attorney's Office, 16 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 225 passim (1981-82).
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violence victims to be crime victims until the 1980s.
O'Hear does not articulate his idea in terms of equality for similarly
situated victims. However, it is a value he implicitly relies upon.
Beyond this, O'Hear integrates the values of equality of similarly
situated defendants and similarly situated victims into a procedure
where victims and defendants are afforded separate consultations with
the prosecutor. What Professor Paul Cassell aptly wrote about
sentencing applies with equal force to plea bargaining: "Equality
demands fairness not only between cases but also within cases. Victims
and the public generally perceive great unfairness in a sentencing system
with 'one side muted.""' 4  In light of the potential for bias against
victims, equality in plea bargains for similarly situated crime victims
should be a priority.
III. THE VALUE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The core idea proposed by O'Hear-that prosecutors consult
meaningfully with victims and defendants in order to arrive at a just plea
offer-is the bare minimum that a free society should demand of a state
performing its public interest responsibilities. A credible argument can
be made that a substantial part of the public's distrust of plea bargaining
is that victims' interests and harm have not been valued in the public
interest function of the plea bargain process. The legislated
embodiment of public distrust is manifested in victims' rights of
consultation with prosecutors,'5 and laws that allow the victim to address
the court at the plea hearing in almost all jurisdictions.16 Seen in this
light, crime victims' rights push back against a restricted definition of
"public interest" that has not, until recently, included individual victim
harm and interests.
14. Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims' Rights
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 494-95 (citations omitted).
15. National Center for Victims of Crime, http://www.victimlaw.info (follow "Topical"
hyperlink; follow "Right to be Heard" hyperlink; select "Conferral with Prosecutor" and click
"Next"; select "States and Territories" and click "Next"; under "Statutory and Regulatory
Provisions," select "Select All" and click "Next"; select "Skip This Step" at Stage 5; at Stage
6, click "Search") (last visited Oct. 19, 2007) (listing current states with victim/prosecutor
consultation laws).
16. See Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as Participants,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 282, 287 (2003) (explaining that the right to speak at sentencing includes
the right to speak at consideration of plea hearings).
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IV. OTHER COMMENTS
O'Hear identifies some of the practical problems of consultation-
essentially the time, effort, and potential frustrations of making the
consulting procedure work. 17 His suggestion that prosecutors only be
required to use "reasonable efforts" is unworkable because such
language has been interpreted as granting the government the discretion
to disregard victim participation rights."8 A better approach is to
mandate consultation on the victim's request and solve the problem by
relying on waiver. For example, victims who make themselves
unavailable waive the right."
O'Hear identifies a critic, Allen Edgar, who argues that consultation
should not take place because of the potential of disappointed victim
expectations.' Edgar's argument is unpersuasive. To deny all victims
consultation because some victims might be disappointed in the plea
bargain assumes too narrowly that victim satisfaction is measured only
by getting the plea bargain the victim wants. The argument ignores that
treating victims with respect for their dignity in the consultation process
matters as much, if not more, to victim satisfaction. Moreover, victims
often feel a sense of responsibility to see that justice is done. At least to
some extent, this responsibility is satisfied with participation even if the
desired outcome is not realized.
The frequently cited punishment values are deterrence (both
individual and general), incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution.
For O'Hear, victim participation is based on the retribution punishment
rationale.2 Retribution is not the only sentencing value relevant to
victim participation. In fact, victims may seek leniency or rehabilitation.
Victims do not desire to see anyone else victimized, and so their
participation supports deterrence. It is not necessarily the case that non-
retributive rationales are exclusively defendant- or state-centric. The
relationship of victim participation to sentencing rationales is ripe for
further scholarly examination.
The external oversight board to monitor prosecutorial discretion
17. O'Hear, supra note 1, at 332-33.
18. United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325, 335 (10th Cir. 1997) (denying the Oklahoma
City bombing victims standing on review to object to their sequestration from trial because
"best efforts" invested discretion in the government).
19. E.g., In re Alton D., 994 P.2d 402, 406-07 (Ariz. 2000) (victim's failure to assert a
right to restitution within a reasonable time constituted a waiver).
20. O'Hear, supra note 1, at 333.
21. Id. at 329-30.
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suggested by O'Hear12 is unlikely to be useful given the subjectivity of
assessing levels of criminal intent. Instead, a two-pronged approach is
needed. First, a change in prosecutorial culture. When sex crimes and
domestic violence crimes were considered undesirable work, smart,
elected district attorneys made special prosecution units and tied status
and promotion to these positions. Because an elected district attorney
has a strong interest in keeping victims satisfied, the elected district
attorney has an incentive to ensure that meaningful consultation takes
place. Second, either failing to consult or denying the victim his right to
address the court concerning the plea agreement should be grounds for
a mis-plea. It may be, as O'Hear suggests, that judges are more likely
than not to accept plea bargains over victims' objections. Nevertheless,
appellate courts uphold trial court decisions rejecting plea bargains
because the prosecutor failed to consult the victim or the victim
objected to the plea bargain.23
Meaningful consultation within a framework of advisory charging
and plea bargain guidelines is a promising approach to achieve equality
for similarly situated victims, promote victim dignity, and satisfy the
victim component of the public interest function. Central to O'Hear's
idea is the flexibility to have information provided by a victim
potentially alter a sentence up or down. Such increased flexibility is
critical to achieving buy-in from a victims' rights perspective. The devil
is in the details, what type of victim input will affect the offer? To what
extent? Moderated by guidelines, O'Hear has proposed that which is
constitutionally permitted in Payne, victim characteristics and the
harm to the individual victim and community. The victim should also be
able to recommend a plea and sentence to the prosecutor.
V. CONCLUSION
While victims and defendants have important differences, O'Hear's
process respects dignity, which means that both victims and defendants
are meaningfully heard and share a similar interest in due process. It is
commonplace for plea offers to be made without meaningful
consultation with defendants. While the lack of consultation is less
22. Id. at 343-44.
23. E.g., State v. Montiel, 122 P.3d 571, 574 (Utah 2005) (rejection of plea bargain
upheld where trial court "expressed reservations about accepting a plea when the State had
not 'even told the person who claims all these things occurred as to what [the State was] going
to do') (alteration in original); People v. Stringham, 253 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491, 494 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988) (upholding trial court's rejection of plea bargain based on victim's objection).
24. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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socially acceptable when exercised against victims of crime, it is likewise
inappropriate for defendants. Regarding the value of equality, the plea
bargain process acquires a new type of equality as similarly situated
victims are also treated similarly, measured not solely by the elements of
a criminal statute, but also by the unique harm to, and characteristics of,
the victim. As to the public interest function, it is served only when
interested individuals are meaningfully consulted. O'Hear's valuable
contribution is the simultaneous application of the three values of
human dignity, equality, and the public interest function to establish
meaningful plea bargain consultation with the state for defendants and
victims alike.
* * *
